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THE EXTENSION OF TITLE VII
TO PENSION PLANS-CITY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPT. OF WATER AND POWER V. MANHART
It is an unlawful employment practice to discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to employment benefits because of his or her sex.1 A
particular problem arises, however, when it is unclear whether the discrimi-
nation is based on sex per se or on a sex unique 2 characteristic.
Traditionally, claims of discrimination based on sex have been brought
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.3 Yet, in
1974, the Supreme Court limited the scope of such claims in Geduldig v.
Aiello, 4 when it held that a state disability plan which excluded pregnancy
related disabilities was not an unlawful denial of equal protection. In re-
sponse to limitations on fourteenth amendment claims, plaintiffs began to
seek redress from unlawful employment discrimination under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 5 Title VII is advantageous because it clearly
articulates the standards used to evaluate employment practices as well as
provides a statutory basis for awarding retroactive relief.6 Recently, how-
L. § 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e (1964 & Supp. IV 1974)
provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin ...
Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964 & Supp. IV 1974).
2. A sex unique characteristic is one which is particular to one sex and not the other. The
ability to bear children and the fact that women as a group live longer than men are examples of
such characteristics.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdicition the equal protection of the laws.
See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (classification "widow" had a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the Florida property tax exemption legislation); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971) (Fourteenth Amendment mandates that a classification based on sex must rest on a fair
and substantial relation to the legislation). See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
(statutory scheme which acted to discriminate against females and which was predicated upon
administrative efficiency violates the due process clause of the fifth amendment).
4. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
5. See International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349 (1977) (holding
that seniority system perpetuating effects of past racial and ethnic discrimination was a prima
facie violation of Title VII); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 436 (1975) (holding
that once employer proves that preemployment tests were job related, complainant must show
that other tests would better perform this function in order to present evidence that employer
was using the tests as a pretext for discrimination); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431 (1971) (holding that pre-employment intelligence test was discriminatory in operation).
6. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). Albemarle involved a class action
on the part of black employees against their employer for discrimination with respect to the
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ever, the Supreme Court limited the use of Title VII with respect to sex
discrimination. For example, the Court held in General Electric Company v.
Gilbert 7 that exclusion of pregnancy from a disability benefits plan did not
violate the statute. Although plaintiffs continue to bring claims of sex dis-
crimination under Title VII, factually similar cases must be carefully distin-
guished from Gilbert in order to prove that such discrimination does indeed
exist.
The most recent Supreme Court decision regarding employment discrimi-
nation under Title VII is City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power
v. Manhart.s As in Geduldig and Gilbert, Manhart involves differentials in
benefits based on a sex unique characteristic. For the first time, however,
the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of whether an employer can lawfully
charge individual women more for benefits because women as a class live
longer than men. 9 Significantly, the Court decided that a factor which is
true for women as a group, but that cannot be individually measured, cannot
be used to differentiate between men and women in terms of employment
benefits. In doing so, it introduced a new test for sex discrimination, and left
the precedential value of previous case law questionable. In addition, the
decision in Manhart extends Title VII employment limitations to certain
kinds of employee pension plans.
This Note will first analyze the Court's decision and discuss the impact on
future Title VII claims with respect to the Equal Pay Act. It will then
examine the legal standards to be used in measuring sex discrimination and
explore the availability of retroactive relief. Lastly, it will further discuss the
impact of both the decision and proposed Labor Department regulations on
the insurance industry.
plant's seniority system and its program of employment testing. The Supreme Court held that
where an employee has been deprived of certain employment opportunities because an
employer has unlawfully discriminated against him, back pay should be denied only for reasons
that do not frustrate the statutory purpose of Title VII. Id. at 422-23.
7. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). See also Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). In Nashville, the Supreme Court held that the employer's policy of
denying accumulated seniority to female employees returning from pregnancy leave constituted
an unlawful employment practice, but the policy of not awarding sick leave pay to pregnant
employees did not violate Title VII without showing that the practice was a mere pretext designed
to effect invidious discrimination against members of one sex.
8. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
9. Id. at 1373-74. Sex based mortality tables, which are derived from actual mortality fig-
ures, demonstrate that the average woman lives approximately five years longer than the aver-
age man. See Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9 (1960) (value of joint and survivor annuity for man of 65 is
same as value for woman of 70). Life expectancy tables of the National Center for Health
Statistics, United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare show that at 60 years of
age women are expected to live 4.8 years longer than men. AMERICAN COUNCIL ON LIFE
INSURANCE FACT BOOK 90 (1976).
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FACTS AND PROCEDURE OF MANHART
The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power required female
employees to make larger monthly contributions 'O than male employees to
its pension fund, based upon the fact that women as a class live longer than
men." Because pension contributions were withheld from paychecks,
female employees took home less pay than male employees earning the same
salary. 12 Upon retirement, men and women of the same age, seniority and
salary received equal monthly benefits, despite the disparity in contribution
rates.
In 1973, the female employees, 13 on behalf of a class of women employed
or formerly employed by the Department, brought suit to remedy this dis-
parity.' 4 The district court, in granting the plaintiff's summary judgment,
held that the contribution differential violated section 703(a)(1) of Title VII, 15
and ordered all excess contributions made by the affected employees to be
refunded. 16  The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 17  In a majority opinion written by
Justice Stevens, I' the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision
that the contribution differential violated section 703(a)(1), but vacated the
judgment of the court of appeals awarding retroactive relief.
The Department's 19 position was that the difference in take-home pay was
offset by the difference in the value of the benefits ultimately received. Bas-
ing the contribution rule on a study of mortality tables and its own experi-
ence, the Department estimated that its 2,000 female employees would, on
the average, live a few years longer than its 10,000 male employees. There-
10. Female employee contributions were 14.84% higher than the contributions of compara-
ble male employees. 435 U.S. at 705.
11. See note 9 supra.
12. The opinion illustrates the significance of this disparity by viewing the record of one
woman whose contributions to the fund amounted to $18,171.40, while a similarly situated male
would have contributed only $12,843.53. 435 U.S. at 705 n.5.
13. In addition to five individual plaintiffs, respondents included the plaintiffs' union, the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 18.
14. While this action was pending, the California Legislature enacted a law prohibiting cer-
tain municipal agencies from requiring greater pension fund contributions from female
employees than from male employees. Therefore, the Department amended its plan, effective
January 1, 1975. See CAL. GOVT. CODE § 7500 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
15. See note [ supra.
16. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power, 387 F. Supp. 980
(C.D. Cal. 1975).
17. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, 553 F.2d 581 (1976).
Two weeks after the decision of the court of appeals, the Supreme Court decided Gilbert. In
response to a petition for rehearing, a majority of the panel concluded that its original decision
did not conflict with the Gilbert decision. Id. at 592 (1977).
18. Justices Stewart, White and Powell joined in all four parts of the decision. Justice Mar-
shall joined in all of the decision but Part IV. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist, joined in Part IV.
19. In addition to the Department itself, the petitioners included members of the Board of
Commissioners of the Department and members of the plan's Board of Administration.
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fore, it reasoned, the average retired female employee would receive more
benefits from the pension fund. Moreover, the Department argued, in the
long run the cost of a pension for the average female would be greater than
that for the average male.20
THE DECISION
In Manhart, the Supreme Court refused to apply a group stereotype, al-
beit an accurate stereotype,2 1 to individual members of that group. 22 The
Court acknowledged that stereotypes may be true with respect to the group
in general, noting that the generalization that women as a group live longer
than men is statistically valid.2 3 However, it also noted that there was no
assurance individual women employees would actually fit the generalization,
since some individual women would live longer than the average man and
some would not. A problem arose therefore, because a group characteristic
such as longevity cannot be predicted on an individual basis.24
Emphasizing the word "individual" in the statutory language,25 the Man-
hart Court construed the statute's focus to preclude treatment of individuals
as part of a group.2 6 Therefore, the Court found even an accurate generali-
zation about a group was an insufficient reason for discriminating against
individuals to whom the generalization did not always apply.2 7
20. 435 U.S. at 705. The Department argued that if females did not contribute more to the
pension fund than males, in actuality, male employees would be subsidizing female employees.
Id. at 708. Actually, the issue of subsidy is doubtful because, as the Court points out, the
Department's plan also provides for survivors' benefits, id. at 709 n. 14, and, since women are
expected to live longer than men, whatever coverage men lose for themselves, they gain in
coverage for their wives.
21. See note 9 supra.
22. 435 U.S. at 708. The language of the opinion indicates that by stereotype the Court
means a generalization that has been applied to women as a class. Id. at 707.
23. See note 9 supra.
24. 435 U.S. at 708.
25. Id. The Court stated that the statute's focus on the individual is unambiguous, and
precludes treatment of individuals as simply components of a particular class. Id.
26. There was no reason to believe that Congress meant discrimination to mean anything
different in insurance capacity. Id. at 710. Although the Court did deal with the impact of
awarding backpay, it made little reference to the impact the decision itself would have on the
insurance industry. See notes 89-111 and accompanying text infra.
27. 435 U.S. at 708. The idea that attributing group statistics to individuals in itself is un-
lawful is not new. In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975), the Court concluded
that under the equal protection clause, even assumptions borne out by statistics cannot justifi-
ably be used as a basis for classification. In Weinberger, a widower sued for survivor social
security benefits, trying to overcome the assumption that men rather than women generally
support the family. See COMMENT, Title VII Ban on Sex Discrimination Extended to Use of Sex
Segregated Mortality Tables for Determining Employee Contributions to Pension Plan, 12 SUF-
FOLK L. REV. 156 (1978); COMMENT, Title VII-Employee Retirement Plans-Unequal Con-
tribution Requirements as Constituting Unlawful Discrimination on the Basis of Sex, 11 LOy.




A. Sex as a Factor
The Court realized that the life expectancy of any individual is based upon
a number of factors, 2 8 sex being only one of them. Because the Department
stated that it relied on longevity rather than sex as the basis for its contribu-
tion rates, it contended that the practice qualified as an exception to the
Equal Pay Act. 2 9 This Act requires employers to pay members of both
sexes the same wages for equivalent work. 30 The Court, however, made a
blanket statement that this alleged exception to the Equal Pay Act did not
apply, because there was no evidence to show that sex was not the only
factor on which the actuarial distinction was based. 3' In other words, the
Court could find no evidence in the record that the Department used any
factor other than sex in calculating the employee contribution rates. 32
28. Both the Massachusetts and the New York legislatures have used a similar analysis to
pass laws banning life insurance rates for blacks. The higher rates had been justified by the fact
that black people, as a group, do not live as long as white people. For an historical explanation
of how the insurance industry has dealt with race and mortality, see generally M. JAMES, THE
METROPOLITAN LIFE-A STUDY IN BUSINESS GROWTH 338-39 (1947). In 1973, the life expec-
tancy of a white baby was 72.2 years and the life expectancy of a non-white baby was 65.9
years. See VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES [1973] PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, IIA,
Table 5-3.
29. 435 U.S. at 712.
30. The Bennett amendment, which is incorporated into Title VII, states that a compensa-
tion differential based on sex would not be unlawful if it was authorized by the Equal Pay Act.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). The Act states that employees who are of the opposite sex, but are
placed in identical employment circumstances, can receive different pay only where payment is
made pursuant to (a) a seniority system; (b) a merit system; (c) a system which measures earn-
ing by quantity or quality of production; or (d) a differential based on any other factor other
than sex. The department argues that its pension plan is in the realm of the fourth exception.
See 29 U.S.C. § 209 (1975). 435 U.S. at 712.
31. The Court rejected the Department's argument that the following dialogue between
Senators Randolph and Humphrey during the Senate debates on the Civil Rights Act was per-
suasive evidence in showing Congressional intent regarding pension plans. The Court simply
stated that the Senator's single comment could not change the effect of the language of the
statute.
MR. RANDOLPH. Mr. President. I wish to ask of the Senator from Minnesota
[Mr. Humphrey], who is the effective manager of the pending bill, a clarifying
question on the provisions of Title VII. I have in mind that the social security
system, in certain respects, treats men and women differently. For example,
widows' benefits are paid automatically; but a widower qualifies only if he is dis-
abled or if he was actually supported by his deceased wife. Also, the wife of a
retired employee entitled to social security receives an additional old age benefit;
but the husband of such an employee does not. These differences in treatment as I
recall, are of long standing. Am I correct, I ask the Senator from Minnesota, in
assuming that similar differences of treatment in industrial benefit plans, including
earlier retirement options for women, may continue in operation under this bill, if
it becomes law?
MR. HUMPHREY. Yes. That point was made unmistakably clear earlier today by
the adoption of the Bennett amendment; so there can be no doubt about it.
110 CONG. REC. 13663-13664 (1964).
32. 435 U.S. at 712.
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The Court devoted little analysis to the issue involving the Equal Pay
Act. 33 Although it mentioned that any individual's life expectancy is based
on many factors, including one' sex, 34 it did not address the question of
whether sex can be considered as a relevant factor when evaluating longev-
ity. Consequently, it is now unclear whether a pension plan basing its con-
tributions on longevity, and considering several factors including sex, which
affect longevity, would be unlawful under Title VII.
The Court in a footnote took notice of the fact that there are conflicting
administrative rules regarding the "factor other than sex" exception to the
Equal Pay Act. 35 It noted that the Wage and Hour Administrator, charged
with enforcing the Equal Pay Act, stated in one section of the regulation that
either equal employer contributions or equal benefits would be satisfactory
(this section will hereinafter be referred to as the either-or rule). 36 At the
same time, the Administrator stated in another section that a wage differen-
tial based on variances in the average costs of employing men and women
was not based on a "factor other than sex" (this section will hereinafter
be referred to as the difference in cost rule).37 The Court found that the
latter statement had more "power to persuade" than the former. 38 Case law
suggests, however, that before a finding of such persuasion can be made, a
court must evaluate the thoroughness evident in the agency's consideration,
the validity of its reasoning and its consistency with earlier and later pro-
nouncements.3 9  Although the Manhart Court failed to discuss these factors,
it presumably used these standards when evaluating the either-or and the
difference in cost rules. Accordingly, the Court's cursory review of the Wage
and Hour Administrator's reasoning 40 suggests that the either-or rule is no
longer good law or needs substantial revision. 41
33. It appears that the Court was unwilling to evaluate the issue of longevity in general. If
annuity costs were truly based upon longevity then many factors other than sex would be consid-
ered, such as health, family history and personal habits. See generally R. RETHERFORD, THE
CHANGING SEX DIFFERENTIAL IN MORTALITY 71-82 (1975). Retherford deals extensively with
the effect of cigarette smoking on the mortality rates of both men and women.
34. 435 U.S. at 712.
35. Id. at 714 n.26.
36. 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d) (1978). This section will be hereinafter referred to as the either-
or rule.
37. 29 C.F.R. § 800.151 (1978). This section will be hereinafter referred to as the difference
in cost rule.
38. 435 U.S. 714 n.26 quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). In
Skidmore, employees who were required to work nights in a stand-by capacity in the employer's
auxiliary fire-fighting service sued for overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standard Act, 29
U.S.C. § 207 (1975).
39. These standards were spelled out by the Court in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944).
40. The Court notes the Administrator's reasons for the second rule, 435 U.S. at 714 n.26.
41. The "either-or rule," 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d) (1976) is dealt with more extensively in the
"Proposed Amendment" section of this note. See notes 112-122 and accompanying text infra.
[Vol. 28:449
MANHART
B. Retreat from Gilbert
The Manhart Court felt compelled to distinguish this decision from Gen-
eral Electric Company v. Gilbert.42  Both cases involved women being
treated differently with respect to employment benefits because of a charac-
teristic unique to women. In Gilbert, however, the Court found no Title VII
violation, reasoning that excluding pregnancy coverage was merely excluding
a benefit and consequently was not discriminatory against women per se.43
The fact that women live longer is, like pregnancy, a sex unique characteris-
tic. Therefore, Manhart and Gilbert are to a considerable extent factually
similar.
The Manhart Court distinguished Gilbert by using the Geduldig test of
whether the practice divided employees into exclusively male and female
groups. 4 4  In Gilbert, the two groups were pregnant women and non-
pregnant persons. The Court noted that the latter group was obviously not
exclusively male or female and, therefore, did not meet the Geduldig test.
The Manhart Court, however, held that since the pension plan required a
greater contribution from an exclusively female group, and the remaining
employees made up an exclusively male group, Gilbert could not be control-
ling. 4 5
42. 435 U.S. at 715.
43. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145 (1976).
44. 435 U.S. at 715. In Geduldig, the Court noted:
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such under
this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The program
divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women and non-pregnant
persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members
of both sexes.
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 n,20 (1974).
45. 435 U.S. at 715. In his concurring opinion to Manhart, Justice Blackmun takes issue
with the distinction the Court has made between Gilbert and Manhart. He states: "The Court's
distinction between the present case and General Electric-seems to me to be just too
easy. . . .For me, it does not serve to distinguish the case on any principled basis." Id. at 725.
Justice Blackmun also points out that Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Gilbert, strongly pro-
tected the very distinction he makes in the Manhart opinion.
It is not accurate to describe the program as dividing 'potential recipients into two
groups-pregnant women and non-pregnant persons.'. . . The classification is be-
tween persons who face a risk of pregnancy and those who do not.
429 U.S. at 161-62 n.5. The Gilbert decision itself has been sharply criticized by commentators.
See Note, Sex Discrimination -Distinction Between Title VII and Equal Protection, 31 RUT-
GERS L. REV. 91 (1978) (Gilbert limits Title VII contrary to Congressional intent; moreover the
EEOC guidelines are the best solution to the pregnancy issue); Note, Discrimination Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 813 (1977) (Gilbert should
be interpreted very narrowly and will not extend beyond the specific fact situation. Equalization
of employment will continue to be the purpose of Title VII.); Note, Pregnancy Disability Ben-
efits, 91 HARV. L. REV. 341 (1977) (criticized Rehnquist's analysis and sets forth three methods
for assessing the impact of a disability plan).
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Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion in Manhart, noted that the
rationale behind the Manhart decision differed from that of Gilbert which
made recognition of the Gilbert precedent questionable. 46  Also, Congress
recently passed legislation which effectively overruled Gilbert by requiring
the term "because of sex" to include pregnancy for all employment related
purposes. 47  Thus, Manhart and this new law have in effect nullified the
substantive precedent of Gilbert. The standards set forth in Gilbert to be
used in evaluating Title VII claims, however, are still relevant.
The standard used by the Manhart Court to distinguish Gilbert,
moreover, can still be applied in the future to factually similar Title VII
claims. 48  The Manhart Court implied that all that is necessary to distin-
guish a discriminatory practice involving a sex unique characteristic from a
non-discriminatory practice is a finding that the practice divides employees
into exclusively male and female groups. If this is the standard to be used in
distinguishing future Title VII claims, then any practice which conceivably
could involve a group that includes both sexes would likely not be consid-
ered discriminatory.
C. A New Test for Sex Discrimination
The correct standard to be used in deciding whether a particular practice
constitutes sex discrimination is not clear. 49 In Griggs v. Duke Power Com-
pany, a landmark Title VII case, 50 the Court emphasized that Congress
46. 435 U.S. at 725. Justice Blackmun challenges the Court to "meet the posture of the
earlier cases head-on and not by thin rationalization that seeks to distinguish but fails in its
quest. I.
47. Pub. L. No. 95-555 (10/31/78) [hereinafter cited as S.995] states in part:
The terms 'because of sex' or 'oi the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of
benefits under fringe benefit programs ...
The Senate report accompanying the proposed legislation declared that the purpose of the bill is
to make clear that discrimination based on pregnancy is indeed discrimination based on sex.
The Committee introducing the bill adopted Justice Brennan's and Justice Stevens' dissents in
Gilbert and noted that the two dissenting opinions correctly "expressed the principle and mean-
ing of Title VII." S. REP. No. 331, 95h Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977).
48. At least one court has decided a case on grounds similar to Manhart and inconsistent
with Gilbert. In Henderson v. Oregon, 405 F. Supp. 1271 (1975), employees challenged the
state's use of two sets of life expectancy tables, one for men and one for women, in calculating
annuity benefits for retired state eimployees. The court found that the practice violated Title
VII. In deciding the question of whether to compare the benefits men and women receive as a
class or to compare benefits of individuals, the court found the analysis of the court of appeals in
Manhart persuasive. The court agreed with the reasoning and the result in Manhart, and found
them applicable to this case. Id. at 1274-75.
49. See Note, Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty: The Demise of the Discriminatory Effect Test, 27
DEPAUL L. REV. 13(11 (1978) (analyzes the basis for the Nashville decision with respect to tests
used in previous Title VII claims.)
50. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, racially discriminatory
employment practices were challenged under § 7(13 (a)(2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
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intended the Civil Rights Act to focus on the consequences of employment
practices, rather than on the motivation behind such practices. The Court
affirmed this discriminatory effect standard in recent decisions, 5 1 finding
employment practices to be unlawful whenever as a consequence of the
practice at issue unfair discrimination has resulted. Although these cases in-
volved claims under the same section of Title VII, 5 2 the implication of the
Court's language regarding both Title VII and the Civil Rights Act in general
is that this standard is applicable to all discriminatory practice claims.
In Gilbert, the Court introduced an alternative standard to be used in claims
brought under section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act. 53  This standard
adopted the equal protection approach, requiring the employee to show that
an employment practice was a "pretext designed to effectuate invidious dis-
crimination." 5 4 However, the language of both the plurality and concurring
opinions in Gilbert suggested that the "pretext" test was not the only test to
be used. Consequently, the discriminatory effect test remained as a valid
alternative. 55
More recently, in Nashville Gas Company v. Satty, the Supreme Court
used the discriminatory effect test to find an employee seniority system vio-
lative of Title 'VII. 56 In the second part of its opinion, the Court required
an employee sick leave plan to meet a "pretext" standard. 57  To confuse
matters further, the Court phrased the test with the words "only if" a pre-
51. International Board of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 349 (1977), citing General Elec-
tric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 137 (1976), Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-7 (1976),
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 422, 405 (1975), and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971). The Teamsters case involved a suit alleging discrimination against minorities in
a seniority system which perpetuated the effects of past discrimination.
52. § 703(a)(2) provides:
It shall be an unlawfuls employment practice for an employer . . . to limit, segre-
gate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 20Oe-2(a)(2) (1964 & Supp. IV 1974).
53. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135-36 (1976).
54. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974).
55. Justice Rehnquist, in his plurality opinion in Gilbert, stated that past Supreme Court
cases have recognized that a prima facie violation of Title VII can be established in some cir-
cumstances upon proof that the effect of an otherwise facially neutral plan . . . is to discrimi-
nate. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136-37. Justice Stewart in his concurring
opinion stated that he did not understand the Gilbert opinion to change the significance of
proving a discriminatory effect in a Title VII case. 1d. at 146 (Stewart, J., concurring).
56. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977). In Nashville, employees challenged
employer's practice of denying accumulated seniority to female employees returning from preg-
nancy leave. Employees also challenged exclusion of pregnancy-related absences from a sick
leave plan and argued that since the employer's seniority plan violated Title VII, this itself is
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the exclusion of pregnancy from the sick leave plan




text designed to effectuate invidious discrimination is found.5 8 The words
"only if" imply that every claim under section 703(a)(1) must meet this standard.
Manhart does little to clarify what standards or tests should be used in
evaluating employment practices in terms of Title VII. The majority did not
apply either the discriminatory effect test or the pretext test to the sec-
tion 703(a)(1) claim. After analyzing the pension fund contribution system in light
of both the purpose of the statute and the stereotype imposed on the women
employees, the Court simply concluded that the employer's practice violated
Title VII. 5 9 Then, it surreptitiously introduced a new test. Such a practice,
the majority stated, did not pass the test of whether the practice involved
"treatment of a person in a manner which but for the person's sex would be
different." 60 It is impossible to tell from the Court's brief mention of the
but for test whether this was intended to be a new standard by which to
measure all or some claims of discrimination raised under Title VII. Fur-
thermore, it is not clear whether the standard applies only as a prima facie
test or as a general standard of review for all claims of employment discrim-
ination. 61 Finally, the unclear status of the tests used in the previous Title
VII cases leaves the law in this area in a state of uncertainty.
13. Denial of Retroactive Relief
Although it recognized both the presumption toward back pay6 2 and the
district court's ability to award this relief,63 the Supreme Court reversed the
award of such retroactive relief in Manhart. The Court offered two main
reasons for this decision. First, it recognized that a conscientious adminis-
trator of the pension fund may have assumed that the Department's plan was
58. Here the court stated that: "Only if a plaintiff through the presentation of other evi-
deuce can demonstrate that exclusion of pregnancy from the compensated conditions is a mere
'pretext designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the
other' does Title VII apply." 434 U.S. at 144.
59. 435 U.S. at 711.
60. Id. (emphasis added) Justice Stevens has taken this "but for" test from his own dissent-
ing opinion from a 1971 Seventh Circuit case. See Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d
1194, 1205 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Sprogis, the plaintiff claimed that
employer's "no marriage" rule discriminated on basis of sex.
61. The original source of the test, miakes the "but for" test a test of prima facie unlawful
employment practice. Note, Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination il Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HAmv. L. REV. 1109, 1170 (1971).
62. 435 U.S. at 719. The Court recognized a presumption toward back pay in Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419-22. In Albemnarle, black employees brought a class
action against their employer, seeking relief against policies and practices of the employer that
were violative of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The major issues were the employer's seniority
policy, the employer's program of testing, and back pay.
63. 435 U.S. at 719. Title VII states that a court that finds unlawful discrimination: "May
enjoin (the discrimination) and order such aHirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement . . . with or without back pay . . . or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g) (1964 & Supp. IV 1974).
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lawful, because the courts had not ruled previously on the question, and the
relevant administrative agencies had conflicting views.64 Second, the Court
felt that, because changes in the rules affecting insurance and pension plans
often have a great impact on the economy, to add the additional burden of
retroactive liability could be both devastating to the fund in question and
harmful to the nation generally.
65
The Court reasoned that the Department's failure to change the unlawful
practice more quickly is justified by the confusion which resulted from the
varied opinions of several administrative agencies. 66  As was noted previ-
ously, the Wage and Hour Administrator has issued conflicting rules on the
subject. 67 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), how-
ever, simply requires the benefits received to be equal benefits. 68  Two
other agencies with responsibility for equal opportunity in employment, the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance and the Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare (HEW), adhered to the Wage and Hour Administrator's
position. 6 9 There was no question, therefore, that the law in this area
needed clarification.
70
The Court's approach focused on the employer and whether back pay was
necessary as a vindictive measure. It stated: "[t]here is no reason to believe
that the threat of a back pay award is needed to cause other administrators
to amend their practices to conform to this decision." 71  Yet, the central
purpose of Title VII is "making persons whole for injuries suffered through
past discrimination." 72 Furthermore, the Court previously held that the
good faith of the employer is not a defense to Title VII or a reason to excuse
the employer from being accountable for past wrongs. 73  Indeed, the pur-
64. 435 U.S. at 720 n.37.
65. 435 U.S. at 721-23.
66. According to the district court, the department was put on notice of unlawful practices
in 1972 when the E.E.O.C. issued an interpretation casting doubt on some varieties of pension
fund discrimination. See 37 Fed. Reg. 6835-37 (1972). Therefore, in determining the amount of
back pay, the district court held the Department responsible beginning April 5, 1972. 387 F.
Supp. 980 (1975).
67. See notes 3.5-41 and accompanying text supra.
68. 29 C.F.R. 1604.9 (e) & (f) (1976).
69. 41 C.F.R. § 60.20.3(c) Office of Federal Contract Compliance; 45 C.F.R § 86.56(b)(2)
(1976) Health, Education, and Welfare.
70. Although it is certain that the law was in need of clarification, the Supreme Court
decided to excuse the Department from paying back pay, without knowing whether the De-
partment made an effort to find out whether or not its plan was legal. 435 U.S. at 730 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
71. 435 U.S. at 720-21.
72. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 421.
73. Id. at 422. Other courts have awarded back pay under Title VII. See Schaeffer v. San
Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002, 1006-7 (9th Cir. 1972) (female employee was entitled
to receive back pay for extra hour per day which male employees but not female employees
were permitted to work. Back pay began from the date of the district court decision invalidating state
maximum hours law. The court used a balancing test: the merit of the plaintiff's claim and the
public policy behind it must be balanced against the hardship on a good-faith employer.) Robin-
1979]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:449
pose of Title VII has never been to punish employers, and whether back pay
is awarded should not depend upon the sincerity of the employer, but on
the injury of the employee. By focusing on the employer's good faith, how-
ever, the Manhart Court failed to award each employee the salary she lost
as a result of an unlawful employment practice. In order to make each
employee "whole" from past discrimination, retroactive relief in the form of
back pay should have been awarded. 74
The Court's second major reason for denying back pay was the impact that
changing the law concerning pension plans will have on the economy. 75
There is no doubt that the impact of the Manhart decision on pension plans
will be great, 76 and that in some cases retroactive liability could have a dras-
tic effect on a pension fund. 77  The language of the Court to an extent im-
plies that awarding relief in this particular situation could be devasting to all
pension funds in the industry. 78  The statute, however, clearly states that a
back pay award may be granted when appropriate.79  Since the Court has a
decision to make in each particular set of circumstances, every pension fund
will not suffer as a result of an award in any particular case.8 0 Perhaps most
son v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 804 (4th Cir. 1971) (court held that employer's de-
partmental seniority system discriminated on the basis of race. The court rejected the defend-
ant's arguments that back pay should not be awarded in light of the unsettled state of the law.
The court stressed that back pay is not a penalty imposed as "sanction for moral turpitude," but
compensation for a tangible economic loss.) DiSalvo v. Chamber of Commerce of Greater Kan-
sas City, 568 F.2d 593, 597 (8th Cir. 1978) (court awarded back pay to former employee who
suffered sex discrimination in matter of pay. In dealing with the question, the court found it
appropriate to consider decisions of the National Labor Relations Board inasmuch as the back
pay provisions of Title VII were expressly modeled on the back pay provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act.) Love v. Pullman Co., 569 F.2d 1074, 1077 (10th Cir. 1978) (court
awarded back pay to employees where employer practiced racial discrimination in employment
classifications.)
74. The framers of Title VII stated that they were using § 10(c) of the NLRA as a model. 49
Stat. 454, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964). 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964) (remarks of
Senator Humphrey). Section 10(c) provides that when the Labor Board has found an unfair
labor practice, it shall issue an order requiring the employer to reinstate the employees with or
without back pay. In earlier versions of the Title VII provision on remedies, it was stated that a
court "may" issue injunctions, but "shall" order appropriate affirmative action. This section was
removed by Substitute Amendment No. 656, 110 CONG. REC. 12814, 12819 (1964). The framers
regarded this as merely a "minor language change," id. at 12723-12724 (remarks of Senator
Humphrey). The Court in Albemarle stated that they could find no legislative intent to retreat
from the NLRA model or to denigrate in any way the status of back pay relief. 422 U.S. at 419
ni.11. Furthermore, in passing the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Congress con-
sidered several bills to limit the judicial power to award back pay. These limiting efforts were
rejected. 118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972).
75. 453 U.S. at 721.
76. See notes 89-111 and accompanying text infra.
77. 453 U.S. at 721.
78. Id. at 721-23.
79. See Title VII remedies section, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964 & Supp. IV 1974).
80. Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion stated: "[I]f a 'devastating' award were made in
some future case, this Court would have ample opportunity to strike it down at that time." 453
U.S. at 731-32. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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important is the fact that nowhere in its briefs did the Department assert
that economic devastation would indeed result if it were required to comply
with a back pay award. The Department presented no evidence that the
relatively small award 8 l would in any way be devastating. Without such evi-
dence,82 the Court based its decision to deny back pay relief on an unsup-
ported rationale.
Finally, in his dissenting opinion,8" Justice Marshall suggested that the
Supreme Court improperly reversed the district court's finding. The Court
stated that it overturned the district court's opinion because the lower court
gave insufficient attention 84 to the nature of remedies under Title VII. Jus-
tice Marshall points out that while the proper test to be used in reversing a
district court opinion is the "clearly erroneous" standard,8 5 the Court based
its ruling on "insufficient attention." Furthermore, the Court did not follow
its own reasoning in Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, in which it found
that the task of finding facts and applying the law is best left to the district
court. 86
Albemarle and Manhart are contradictory holdings. In Albemarle, the
Supreme Court stated that a "clearly erroneous" test should be used to
determine whether the district court erred in denying back pay, but in
Manhart the Court simply reversed the district court's award based upon a
standard of "insufficient attention." Not only did the Court not distinguish
Manhart from Albemarle, but it made a point of stating that Albemarle is
still a good precedent.8 7  Consequently, it will be difficult for lower courts
to determine when back pay is appropriate and under what circumstances a
district court opinion regarding back pay may be overruled. 88
81. The amount involved in 15% of the contributions made by a minority (2,000 female as
opposed to 10,000 male employees) of the Department's employees for a 33 month period. 553
F.2d at 592. See aL~o Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978) (landmark Su-
preme Court decision where the Court overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)), in
holding that local government officials and/or local independent school boards are "persons"
within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when equitable relief is sought against them in their
official capacities. The Court awarded back pay in this situation despite the well-known financial
status of the City of New York. Monroe held that municipal corporations were not within the
purview of § 1983.
82. In its petition for certiorari, the Department itself contemplated that the money for the
award would come from city revenues, Petitioner's Brief for certiorari at 30-31. The Department
therefore would pay for this Title VII award in the same way that it would have to pay any
ordinary back pay award arising from discriminatory practices.
83. 453 U.S. at 728 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84. 453 U.S. at 719 (emphasis added).
85. The source of the "clearly erroneous" rule is FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). In Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 424, the Court applies the rule to Title VII.
86. Id. at 415-18.
87. 453 U.S. at 723.
88. For example: after Manhart it is questionable whether back pay should be granted only
when the decision will have little or no effect on the economy. Furthermore, it is questionable





The legal impact of Manhart is great, particularly with respect to the re-
lated issues the Court did not deal with. The Court's holding that an indi-
vidual woman cannot be penalized because women as a group live longer
than men, indicates that the Court supports a strong presumption toward
fairness to the individual under Title VII. It would seem to follow that in the
future, when a group characteristic cannot be predicted on an individual
basis, Title VII will be interpreted in favor of the individual. The decision
leaves open the question of whether sex can ever be used as a factor in
determining longevity for employee benefits purposes. Future claims in
which employees had made unequal contributions based on differences in
longevity, where the longevity determination was based upon several factors
including sex, may or may not result in a Title VII violation.
Although Gilbert has been overruled by legislation, the standard the
Court used to distinguish Manhart from Gilbert likewise will have an impact
on future claims. It appears possible that factually similiar circumstances
could give rise to a Title VII violation if the groups involved are made up of
men or women exclusively. Furthermore, it is unclear what test will be used
to evaluate claims of employment discrimination. While both the "dis-
criminatory effect" test and the "mere pretext" test are still viable, Justice
Stevens has introduced a "but for" test as well. Thus, the Court has not
conclusively determined which, if any, of these tests will be used as stan-
dards in deciding future Title VII claims.
Finally, by refusing to award retroactive relief, the Court has limited the
statutory presumption in favor of such relief. It is quite possible that it will
be more difficult for claimants to receive a retroactive award despite the fact
that the stated purpose of Title VII is to make employees whole. Moreover,
it appears that the Court has established a kind of balancing test, where a
significant impact on the industry involved could be found to outweigh the
plaintiffs' rightful claim to retroactive relief. Whether this test will be used in
future claims remains to be seen.
B. Impact on the Insurance Industry
In order to fully understand the impact of the Manhart decision on the
pension plan industry, it is important to understand the distinctions between
types of pension plans. Pension plans can be divided into two main types: 1)
clear. For further analysis of standards to be used in awarding back pay, see Note, The Stan-
dard for Awarding Back Pay in a Title VII Action, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 466 (1976) (notes
that in Albemarle the Court established a standard for awarding back pay which looks only to
general purposes of Title VII.); Note, Testing Standards and Back Pay Under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 89 HARV. L. REV. 225-34 (1975) (Court's rejection in Albemarle of
good faith defense to back pay liability appears correct when viewed in terms of statutory
policies; however, trial courts must be permitted to retain equitable discretion.)
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defined benefit plans; and 2) defined contribution plans. The two types of
plans are very different in design, philosophy and the manner in which they
take into account a person's sex.
The more traditional plan is the defined benefit plan, in which a defined
amount of monthly pension is received by each employee upon retirement.
Providing an appropriate monthly benefit to the individual is the employer's
objective. 89  The amount of benefit9 ° is usually formulated in view of the
employee's salary and years of service. The employer generally bears the
entire cost of the plan as well as the entire risk of changes in cost. Although
in some such plans, the employee contributes a specific amount of his or her
salary to the pension plan fund, the entire risk is still borne by the
employer. Therefore, equal cost per employee is not an objective of this
type of plan, 91 because it will cost the employer different amounts to pro-
vide a pension for different employees. 92
A plan in which the employer allocates a fixed contribution to all indi-
vidual account for each employee's benefit is called a defined contribution
plan. 93 The amount of contribution is generally based upon a percentage of
salary, independent of age and sex. The employee bears the risks in changes
in costs and benefits under this type of plan. The fund is usually invested by
the employer, and the return on that investment will determine the amount
of individual benefits.9 4  At the time of retirement, benefits are distributed
to employees either in a lump sum or, if the employee so elects, the amount
of benefits may be used to purchase an annuity. If an annuity is purchased
from a financial institution (usually an insurance company), the age and sex
of the employee will affect the amount of monthly payment 95 because Title
VII does not require such institutions to eliminate these factors in determin-
ing rates. Title VII can only require employers to treat the sexes equally.
The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power provided a defined
benefit plan for its emnployees. 96 The Department's plan was somewhat un-
89. Donald S. Grubbs, Sex and Pension Plans, (April 11, 1978) (presented at joint meeting
of Casualty Actuarial Society and the Society of Actuaries, New York) at 2 [hereinafter cited as
Grubbs].
90. Id. at 2. An example of a benefit formula would be $10.00 per year of service, or 50% of
final average pay. Id.
91. Id. at 3.
92. Pensions generally have a higher cost as a percentage of pay for employees hired at
older ages than for those hired at younger ages. Under final average pay plans, the cost of
benefits is higher for employees with rapid salary increases. Although the cost of providing a
monthly pension at retirement is higher for females than for males, many employers find that the
cost of providing pensions for females is a lower percentage of pay for males because of higher
turnover rates and lower rates of salary increase. Id. at 3.
93. Profit-sharing plans, thrift plans, and savings plans are all types of defined contribution
pension plans. Id. at 1.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2.
96.' Memo from William A. Kurtz to William D. Courtney (May 12, 1978) (CNA Insurance
Co.), at 2; The Department stated in its brief that the plan provides for several kinds of pension
benefits at the employee's option, and that the most common is a formula pension equal to 2%
1979]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
usual though, in that it required a contribution from each employee. 9 7  If
construed narrowly, the Manhart rule only applies to the small group of
defined benefit plans which require employee contributions and require a
greater contribution from women than from men with comparable salaries.
These plans are now required to be amended in such a way that men and
women with the same salaries contribute equal amounts. 98  Most commen-
tators feel that initially the Manhart rule will directly affect very few plans,
because at least in the private sector there are few plans which operate in
this manner. 99 It is possible, however, that some government plans will
have to be adjusted. 10 0
If the Manhart decision is construed to prohibit sex differentials in any
pension plans, then many other adjustments will have to be made. Under
defined contribution plans, employees may elect either to receive their share
of the fund in a lump sum or to apply their account balance to purchase
annuities. Since annuities with equal rates for both sexes do not currently
exist in the market, 10 1 and if unequal monthly annuity payments are no
longer permitted, it is possible that employers will eliminate the annuity
option completely and force employees to take lump sum paynents.
10 2
Thus, employees would be deprived of any choice in this regard.
Changes in defined benefit plans would be less dramatic. In order to
eliminate all sex differentials in defined benefit plans, unisex actuary tables
must be used to determine equivalent amounts of contribution. 1 3  A
number of such plans have voluntarily adopted unisex tables, and the transi-
tion can be a fairly easy one within the appropriate amount of time.10 4 The
question then becomes: should the Manhart case serve as notice to adminis-
trators of pension funds to begin instituting these changes?
of the average monthly salary paid during the last year of employment, times the number of
years of employment. The benefit is guaranteed for life. 453 U.S. at 705 n.3.
97. Grubbs, supra note 89, at 6. See also 29 Pension and Profit Sharing, Report Bulletin 55,
(April 28, 1978) 2; 29 Pension and Profit Sharing, Report Bulletin 56, (May 5, 1978) 5.
98. 29 Pension and Profit Sharing, Report Bulletin 55, (April 28, 1978) p. 2 ; Legal Times of
Washington, Oct. 2, 1978, "Agencies Requiring Equal Benefits."
99. See note 97 supra.
100. 29 Pension and Profit Sharing, Report Bulletin 55, (April 28, 1978) 3.
101. Title VII has no effect on sex discrimination in pension plans or insurance policies
purchased commercially. Title VII only mandates the relationship between employees and
employers. Therefore, the Manhart decision only requires changes in pension plans that are
part of employment benefits.
102. Grubbs, supra note 89, at 7.
103. As one article pointed out:
The only risk free policy for plan administrators is to eliminate use of gender based
actuarial tables for all purposes other than cost calculations, while raising the level
of payment of accrued benefits to the level of the previously favored sex. However,
it is too early to conclude that this course of conduct is an absolute requirement of
the law.
Legal Times of Washington, Oct. 2, 1978, "Agencies Extend 'Manhart' Doctrine to Require
Equal Monthly Benefits."
104. Grubbs, supra note 89, at 7.
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In assessing just how far the Manhart decision reaches, it is important to
consider certain aspects of the pension industry that are not discussed in the
Manhart opinion. The Court noted that the employer contributed an amount
equal to 110% of all employee contributions.10 5 This means that employer
contributions for female employees were greater than those for male
employees.1 0 6  Yet, the Court did not hold this practice to be unlawful
under Title VII. Therefore, it is possible that the law will allow employers to
make unequal contributions as long as they result in equal benefits. 10 7
Furthermore, the Court stated that nothing in its holding implies that it
would be unlawful for an employer to set aside equal retirement contribu-
tions for each employee and let each individual, upon retirement, purchase
the largest benefit which his or her accumulated contributions could com-
mand on the open market, 10 8 a common practice in defined contribution
plans.
The alternative, of course, is for employers to purchase annuities for their
employees and absorb the expense of providing equal benefits. 10 9 If
employers choose not to absorb this expense, then they may be forced to act
as the Court seems to suggest and will simply send their employees out to
purchase their own annuities. As a result, employees will meet the same sex
discrimination in the open market as they did in their jobs. 110 Conse-
quently, without parallel legislation which calls for similar changes in pension
plans between employees and/or employers and institutional third par-
ties, the Manhart decision will do little to remove sex discrimination in pen-
sion plans. Employers who do not wish to provide equal benefits will be
able to simply force employees to purchase unequal benefits on the open
market."'
105. 453 U.S. at 705 n.4.
106. See note 96 supra.
107. See notes 35-41 and accompanying text supra.
108. 453 U.S. at 717.
109. Since insurance companies are not required to equalize prices for annuities for men and
women, employers will be required to spend more for annuities for female employees than for
male employees. Because Manhart holds that employers cannot require female employees to
contribute more than males, the added cost must be absorbed by the employer.
110. See note 101 supra.
111. A very broad extension of Manhart, into the life insurance area, would potentially limit
sex discrimination toward males. Most life insurance policies are more expensive for males than
for females, since men as a group have a shorter life span, they will pay fewer premiums. A
logical but far-reaching, extension of Manhart, might be that requiring male employees to pay
more than female employees for an employer sponsored life insurance policy that is worth the
same amount to all employees, is unlawful under Title VII. Few commentators have dealt with





The principles of Manhart have already been extended by the Depart-
ment of Labor in a proposed amendment to the interpretive bulletin of the
Equal Pay Act. 112 The interpretive bulletin presently provides that the
Equal Pay Act is not violated where the plan provides either equal benefits
to both men and women or when both men and women and/or the employer
make equal contributions.1 13 The Administrator has proposed that this in-
terpretation be replaced with one that clearly states that employee benefits
are "wages" within the meaning of the Equal Pay Act and a differential in
benefits based upon sex does not comply with the Act, regardless of whether
the employer has made equal contributions. In addition, the amendment
incorporates the Manhart holding that employees of one sex cannot be re-
quired to make greater contributions from their wages in order to receive
equal benefits. 114
112. Proposed Regulations by the Labor Department Wage and Hour Division and Office of
Federal Contract Compliance on Equal Benefits for Men and Women. 43 Fed. Reg. 38029,
38057 (Aug. 25, 1978) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d) and 800.151).
113. Noted previously as the "'either-or" rule. See notes 35-41 and accompanying text supra.
114. The text of the proposed amendments appears as follows:
§ 800.116(d) Equality and inequality of pay in particular situations: (d) Employee
benefits. Employee benefits are "wages" within the meaning of the act. A differen-
tial in benefits based upon differences between the cost to the employer of provid-
ing benefits to women as a group and the cost of providiixg benefits to men as a
group does not qualify as a differential based on a "factor other than sex" within the
meaning of section 6(d)(1)(iv) of the act. Such a differential therefore violates the
equal pay requirements of the act. Similarly, the act is violated if employees of one
sex are required to make greater contributions from their wages than are employees
of the opposite sex in order to receive equal benefits. Los Angeles Dept. of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 46 U.S.L.W. 4347 (April 25, 1978). See also § 800.151 of this
chapter ...
It is further proposed to amend 29 C.F.R. § 800.110 as follows:
§ 800.110 Meaning of "wages"
Wages paid to an employee generally includes all payments made to or on behalf of
the employee as remuneration for employment. The term "wages" used in section
6(d)(1) of the act (the purpose of which is to assure men and women equal remuner-
ation for equal work) will therefore include payments which may not be counted
under section 3(m) of the act toward the minimum wage (the purpose of which is to
assure employees a minimum amount of remuneration unconditionally available in
cash or in board, lodging or similar facilities). Similarly, the provisions of section
7(e) of the act under which some such payments may be excluded in computing an
employee's "regular rate" of pay for purposes of section 7 do not authorize the
exclusion of any such remuneration from the "wages" of an employee in applying
section 6(d) of the act. Thus, vacation and holiday pay, and premium payments for
work on Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, regular days of rest, or other days or hours
in excess or outside of the employee's regular days or hours of work are remunera-
tion for employment and therefore wage payments that must be considered in ap-
plying the equal pay provisions of the act, even though not a part of the employee's
"regular rate." On the other hand, payments made by an employer to an employee
which do not constitute remuneration for employment are not "wages" to be com-
pared for equal pay purposes under section 6(d) of the act. Examples are such
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The Department of Labor has used Manhart as a basis for ending the
confusion over the either-or rule, 115 finally declaring it an incorrect interpre-
tation of the Equal Pay Act. 116  In amending its regulations, the Depart-
ment of Labor agreed with the Supreme Court's comment that the differ-
ence in cost rule was more persuasive. 1 7 The major reason given by the
Department of Labor for the amendment was that the either-or rule ignored
the basic premise that the Equal Pay Act requires workers to receive equal
"wages" for equal work."" Therefore, the Department reasoned that if
employer contributions were wages, they should be equal; if employee bene-
fits were wages, they too should be equal; and if both were wages, both
should be equal. 119 Thus, it determined that a rule which states that, if one
is equal the other need not be, contradicts the basic requirement of the
Equal Pay Act.
If the proposed amendment is made final, all employers will be required
to amend employee pension plans to comply with the new equal benefit
rule. 120  Whereas the Manhart decision, if construed narrowly, only applies
to a small number of existing plans, the proposed Department of Labor
amendment will extend the basic principles of Manhart to all employer pen-
sion plans. The equal benefits rule, however, is still limited to employer/
employee arrangements and has no effect on pension plans which are pur-
chased by employees from third parties. If employers find that it is too ex-
pensive to provide equal benefits,' 2 1 they may simply elect to give the
employees their accrued balance as a retirement benefit 122 and allow them
to purchase their own benefit plan. Consequently, males and females of the
same age and salary will receive equal funds from their employers at retire-
ment, but because Manhart will not apply they will not be able to purchase
equal retirement plans from insurance companies.
reasonable payments for reimbursable expenses of traveling on the employer's busi-
ness as are discussed in section 778.217 of this chapter.
115. 43 Fed. Reg. 38029, 38057 (Aug. 25, 1978).
116. Id. at 38030.
117. See notes 35-41 and accompanying text supra.
118. 43 Fed. Reg. 38029, 38057 (Aug. 25, 1978).
119. Id. at 38031.
120. It appears that the most significant compliance problem that plan administrators will face
arises from statutory requirements of the Equal Pay Act. Section 206(d) clearly prohibits reduc-
tion of the wage rate of any employee in order to adjust for past discrimination and therefore
requires that at least accrued benefits be raised to the level of the favored sex. 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (1975). The EEOC informally concurs in this interpretation. For more discussion of this
problem, see Agencies Requiring Equal Benefits, Legal Times of Washington, Oct. 2, 1978.
121. See note .109 supra.
122. Benefits may be distributed to employees at the time of retirement or earlier termina-
tion of employment, or in some cases while still actively employed. The amount distributed to
the employee is his or her account balance. See Grubbs, supra note 89, at 3.
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CONCLUSION
Although the Manhart opinion upholds a continuing presumption of fair-
ness to the individual under Title VII, the status of sex as a factor in deter-
mining longevity is still unclear. Neither has the Court eliminated any of the
confusion caused by previous decisions dealing with the appropriate standard
to be used in measuring sex discrimination in employment practices.
Further, the presumption toward retroactive relief under Title VII has seem-
ingly been weakened in situations where the decision may have a significant
impact on the industry involved. Finally, without parallel legislation that
extends to pension plans which employers and employees purchase from in-
surance companies, neither the Manhart holding nor the proposed Depart-
ment of Labor amendments will completely erase the unequal treatment of
the sexes in this area.
Cynthia R. Hirsch
